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Introduction
The May 1981 victory of the Socialist Party in France was supposed 
to auger a transformation of the way in which the French state conducted itself 
in all areas. This paper will attempt to answer the question "Has there 
been any transformation, fundamental or otherwise, of French military 
relations with sub-Saharan, French-speaking Black Africa?" The study area 
is comprised of fourteen contiguous nations* Benin, Cameroon, Central 
Africa Republic (CAR), Chad, Congo, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger,
Senegal, Togo, Upper Volta, and Zaire* The first thirteen were French 
colonies which attained independence around 1960. Zaire is a former Belgian 
colony, but it has identified itself closely with France since the 
middle 1960s.
This study is divided into four sections. The first will detail the 
security dimension of the immense legal and administrative apparatus known 
as Cooperation. The second will analyze the pattern of French arms sales 
to the region. The third will describe and attenpt to arrive at pertinent 
generalizations about French armed interventions in the area since inde­
pendence. The final section will focus on the most recent and largest 
French intervention - the 1983-84 deployment of French troops in Chad.
It is intended that the analysis in each section will constitute a 
comprehensive explication of French military activity in the region. The major 
moving forces behind this militarism will be identified and their intrac­
tableness and resistance to change will be emphasized. This researcher 
is ultimately attempting to endow the reader with some sense of why the Socialists' 
movement toward the transformation of military relations with the area was
1
2so utterly defeated, and why these forces will continue to inform French 
militarism in a determinate fashion for the foreseeable future.
Chapter I Military Cooperation
Prance and the African countries included in this study have operated 
with a remarkable cohesiveness in military matters. Illustrative of this 
is the network of cooperation agreements in place between France and 
several of these new nations since the early 1960s. These arrangements 
consist of defense agreements and military technical assistance agreements 
(hererfter referred to as MTAAs)• Another dimension of Franco-African 
military cooperation is evident in the proliferation of strategic raw 
material cooperation agreements.
The defense agreements, generally bilateral, provide in times of 
crisis for the mutual military commitment of France and the African country* 
In reality, these agreements have most often served as a pretext for French
military intervention. In most of these agreements the actual deployment 
of French forces is contingent upon the request of the African government. 
However, the original French agreements with Chad and the CAR provided for 
"automatic” French intervention in time of peril.* These two countries 
were extremely beholden to France for the maintenance of order at the 
time of independence* and even today they are two of the most unstable 
states in an area of great instability.
France yet maintains defense agreements with five other Francophone
nations} Senegal, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Togo, and Cameroon (see Appendix,
Table I). With the exception of Cameroon, all have engaged in joint
2bilateral military maneuvers with France since 1965. Under the aegis of 
the defense agreements, Gabon, the Ivory Coast and Senegal still consent 
to French military bases. The largest contingent of French troops in Slack 
Africa today (until last fall 3,506 but now 1,006) is deploy** in Chad.
3
4Thus, these states with which Franco has a defense agreement may be said to 
be generally more firmly enmeshed ir France*s African military presence 
than most others. The only exception to this is Zaire, whose emergent 
military tins with France have occurr.-d without the benefit of a defense 
agreement. Yet Zaire is the only country outside of the original French 
Union to sign an MTAA with France.
Military technical assistance agreements were signed, on a bilateral 
basis, between France and almost every one of its former 
colonies (the sole exception being Guinea), almost inmediately upon 
independence. Originally, these agreements addressed themselves to the 
two concerns of training enough Africans to fill large lacunae in African 
military command structures and of providing African countries with 
sufficient materials for self •'defease. French analyst Roman Yakemtchouk 
explains!
The putting in place of this system facilitated the formation of 
African armies ~ some 5,000 soldiers per country - and the doubling 
in size of the gendarmerie, the entire system being supported by a 
certain number flight tanks as well as by transport and liaison 
aircraft. The equipment furnished by France consisted of arms 
adapted specifically to the African nations, which, naturally, aire 
understood to continue living in fraternal peace% This cooperation 
functional without any difficulties for a dozen years.*
The African armies created and structured as a result of these agreements 
were of modest size —  that is, large enough to ensure internal security, 
hut not large enough to make war on neighbors or to challenge French
5military capabilities in the region. This arrangement seems to have been 
specifically designed to keep pro-French regimes in power, while preventing 
the rise of a significant unsurper of French influence. As shown in Table II 
the military establishments of former French colonies have generally remained 
of smallish stature.
Franco-African military cooperation has changed in several ways since 
the early 1960s. By 1972, Benin, Congo, and Niger had cancelled their 
defense agreements with France, Only Cameroon bucked this trend by signing 
its first defense agreement in November of 1977. Gabon and the Central 
African Republic renegotiated their MTAAs in the late 1960s, while the rest 
of Francophonie (save Upper Volta) renegotiated their MTAAs in the middle 
19708, Zaire was added to the MTAA family in 1974 (see Appendix, Table I).
The character of the alterations sought by the Africans was not that 
of rejecting a major French role in their military affairs. Since then, 
only in Mali and Benin have the French been eclipsed by other foreign 
powers. At the same time, the French role has expanded greatly in Zaire 
and in other areas outside of the traditional French sphere (see Appendix, 
Tables III and IV).
In escaping a French monopoly, Africans desired to diversify their 
sources of provisions and increase their acquisitions of military supplies,* 
Also some countries sought to proscribe legally unforeseen and undesirable 
French interventions. The FffAA signed between France and Niger on 
February It* 1977 explicitly disallows French assistants from being 
associated with "the preparation or the execution of war operations or 
the re-establishment of order* The V e -ostablishewnt of order" rationale 
hos been repeatedly smpleyed as a pretaxt for French intervention. It is
6apparent that the government of Seyni Kountche seeks what means of military 
security it can derive from France, while attempting to minimize the risk 
of French meddling.
Current MTAA deals with such diverse lements as logistical support
for armies and state police forces, military hospitals, and a whole host
of other mutual facilities.6 Even in countries such as Upper Volta and
Niger, where a French military presence is not obvious in the form of troops
or large numbers of advisors, France yet remains in control of vital
security instruments. According to Briton Tamar Golan, MIn Upper Volta
and Niger, the French Xntelec controls ill telex, radio, and telephone
operations....In the field of military communications, French control is
7even more striking." Golan implies French complicity in the 1974 coup
which brought Kountche to power in Niger, in that Frenchmen so well-placed
did nothing to protect the unfortunate President iiamani Diori. This is not
to suggest that by such means France can determine events throughout
Francophonie. If this were so, Thomas Sankara, with his leanings toward
Libya and Ghana, could never have become the strongman of Upper Volta in
August of 1983. However, elsewhere, and certainly in the core of
"neo-colonies," France has this power with which it can head off trouble.
In the Ivory Coast, military radio systems, coding, and all military
8intelligence is in the hands of French technicians. Clearly, little can 
happen in the Ivory Coast without the French knowing about it in advance. 
Military Advisors
Perhaps the most obvious indicator of a French military presence 
(beside actual troops) is the level and the number of military advisors. 
Since their mission is to train Africans for command positions, the numbers
7on the continent do not tell the whole story. While the number of French 
military advisors in Africa dropped from 3,000 in 1963 to about 1,200 in 
1980, the number of Afr icans training in France each year has r ' <ien from
9about 200 in 1963 to about 2,000 in 1980. Thus, French influence has 
not necessarily waned, despite the lower French military profile in Africa.
As Briton Robin Luckham explains:
Broadly speaking, the level of French influence on African armies has 
not been reduced since independence so much as shifted up the hierarchy 
of military reproduction! from the exercise of day-to-day command 
functions and the provision of basic military training in the 1960s, 
to the provision of more advanced staff and technical training in 
France, often related to sales of complex hardware, and the establish­
ment of academies and specialized training schools in Africa— some 
on a regional basis— in the 1970s and 1980s. There has developed, 
moreover, a dense network of personal contacts between African and 
French military men.'*'0
The impact of this presence is hard to assess definitely and is 
possibly deceiving. The American military positions in Ethiopia and Iran 
appeared solid in the early 1970s, underscored by an enormous investment 
in training and armaments. However, ten years later, Ethiopia had become 
a Soviet client state and Iran a fundamentalist Arab republic. The Soviets 
suffered similar reversals in Egypt and Somalia. However, the French 
position, particularly in places like the Ivory Coast, Gabon, and Senegal, 
is strengthened by a long standing French cultural hegemony over the 
educated classes. In those places in which Islam is not prevalent (countries
8south of the Sahel), this cultural influence is especially powerful.
French Technical Assistance
From 1960 to 1980, the number of French technical cooperants in Africa
increased from about 10,000 to about 11,000.** These figures include the
aforementioned military training personnel as well as any ancillary
personnel needed to fulfill the diverse tasks of Franco-African cooperation.
Included among French technical assistants are functionalres positioned in
immediate African presidential entourages, cabinet staffs, and other key
government posts. Their influence must be great indeed,given the highly
centralized nature of political power in nations which had been patterned
in form (though in reality are even more restrictive) after the political
structure of highly centralized France. In the Ivory Coast, for example,
the Director of the Cabinet, the Secretary General of the government, and
the recently resigned Houphouet Boigny's private secretary were all 
12Frenchmen. Some analysts have attributed both the rise of Colonel 
Bokassa and the precipitous fall of Emperor Bokassa to the fact that the 
administration of the Central African Republic was shot through with French* 
men. This had to h*we greased the way for the anti-Bokassa coup d'etat in 
1979.13
As is the case with military advisors and troops, these political
cooperants are concentrated in those African nations where the French stake
in political stability is the greatest. Three-quarters of French technical
personnel in Africa are situated in Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Gabon, and
Senegal. These countries are Included in what Luckham calls France's
14"central group of neo-colonies."
9Rita Cruise O'Brien charges that the French technical assistants,
so well placed in the governmental structures of these countries# are
very defensive of the administrative and political status quo. That is
how they preserve their influence and that of France. However# this
phenomenon stalls the Africanization of elites and is contrary to the
official mission of technical assistance. Salaries and housing must be
provided for these "volunteer" technical assistants. In Senegal# for
example# O'Brien asserts that "most outspoken local critics of the technical
assistance program regard the scheme as an indirect Senegalese subsidy to
15the French armed forces." This must be a tremendous burden for the
already-strained local economies# but apparently the elites are willing to
bear the costs in exchange for close involvement with the French.
The most glaringly unbalanced institutional relationship in Franco-
African cooperation has been in the realm of diplomacy. Instead of
channeling diplomatic relations with her former colonists through the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs# as is France's practice with the rest of the
world# France has traditionally handled such dealings through the Ministry
of Cooperation (recently renamed the Ministry of Cooperation and
Development). This ministry is in structure and personnel strikingly
similar to the colonial Ministry of Overseas Territories. The number of
French diplomatic personnel involved is beyond the level generally
recognized by diplomatic traditional standards. In addition# the French
ambassador is automatically the dean of the diplomatic corps in
Francophone African c o u n t r i e s i n  fact# in Gabon# President Omar Bongo
has been characterised as being "led by the hand" by French Ambassador
17Maurice Delanney.
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This diplomatic dependency has it origins in the shortlived French 
18Union. of course, several Francophone countries have distanced their 
foreign policies from affiliation with the French, in favor of greater 
cooperation with the Soviets or the Chinese. But undoubtedly those 
African nations having expansive economic and military ties with France 
as well as intimate French involvement in their diplomatic processes must 
always keep a weather eye toward France before adjusting their policies. 
Strategic Raw Material Agreements
Another significant set of cooperation agreements includes those 
concerning strategic raw materials. These agreements are aimed at 
guaranteeing French access, while limiting other foreign access to such 
materials in the participating Francophone African nations (see Appendix, 
Table 5). Such preferential access is necessary so that the French nuclear 
weapons program will continue to be adequately supplied. Over half of the 
uranium for the program comes from these nations. France produces 1*200 
metric tons of uranium annually, but Niger, the Central African Republic,
19and Gabon produce 1,500, 500, and 400 metric tons per annum, respectively.
In addition, France secures from Africa significant amounts of nickel, 
cobalt, and copper. Since the middle 1970s, Zaire has become an important 
supplier of strategic raw materials for France while not actually a 
signatory to any agreements.
Since the 1960s, France has continually strived to upgrade and expand 
her nuclear capabilities. For Frenchmen of the Right or the Left, it would 
appear that France's independent nuclear arsenal is very important, not 
only for deterring the Soviets, but also for enhancing French prestige in
11
both the Arab world and the Third World. Having an independent nuclear 
arsenal endows France with an almost "great power" status. Thus, a steady 
flow of strategic raw materials becomes a high priority for French military 
policy in Africa. This is supported by the pattern of French armed 
interventions in the Francophone regions of Africa. All of this will be 
further elaborated on in Chapter III,
The most salient of recent trends in Franco-African cooperation has 
been the inclusion of Zaire into the network of military cooperation 
agreements. Within four years after signing the Military Technical 
Assistance Agreement on May 22, 1974, Zaire had become perhaps France's 
best arms customer in Africa, and France had been called upon twice to 
intervene militarily in support of the Mobutu regime.
The Franco-Zairian MTAA is similar to other Francophone African
which had been renegotiated in the middle 1970s, The purpose of French
assistance is to serve as instructors to Zairian military personnel and
to aid in the organisation of the Zairian armed forces, the largest among
Franco-African cooperants. But the by then familiar restriction was
appliedt "In no case are they permitted to take part in the preparation
or the execution of war operations, the maintenance or re-establishment
20of order or law." It appears that Mobutu desired to augment the western 
assistance already forthcoming from Belgium and the United States, while 
minimizing the risk of an anti-Mobutu coup assisted by France.
This approach toward Zaire during Giscard d'Betaine's septennet seemed 
to compensate for the diminishing French presence in Madagascar and Benin,
12
Thus, Giscard left his successor an African policy closely associated with
one of the most notoriously abusive dictators in Africa. The continuance
of such closeness would seem to contradict not only Mitterrand's vocal
pronouncements on the sacredness of the Rights of Man, but also the
Socialist Party's well known distaste for such unprogressive regimes.
However, "at the end of September 1981 President Mitterrand's counselor for
African Affairs, Guy Penne, announced during a visit to Kinshasha, a
21reinforcement of Franco-Zairian cooperation in all domains." This 
reinforced cooperation has continued unabated to the present time.
How significant is Franco-African cooperation in guaging Franco- 
African military relations? Since each Francophone African country and 
Zaire have military cooperation agreements with France, most Franco-African 
intercourse on military matters occurs within the framework of these 
agreements. The many and varied functions of cooperation in military, 
political, and diplomatic domains have resulted in the creation of an 
enormous and far-flung bureaucracy to prosecute these functions. Such a 
bureaucracy would be very difficult to disentrench.
The agreements themselves may be more important in substance than in
22juridical form, as Robin Luckham asserts. These agreements are indicative, 
if not directive, of the differential levels of French military involvement 
in Africa. Those closest to France have defense agreements with her. The 
mutual courtship of France and Zaire in the late 1960s and early 1970s was 
consummated in the signing of a Military Technical Assistance Agreement 
in 1974. Congo and Benin purposefully distanced themselves from France by 
abrogating their defense agreements, as they adopted strident Marxist- 
Leninist political lines. More recently, under the French Socialists,
13
there has been movement toward improved relations with Benin. Since
President Mitterrandfe visit to Benin in 1982, negotiations have been
undertaken to revise the current Franco-Benin MTAA with a view toward
23greater military cooperation between the two nations*
One enduring legacy of cooperation which will be discussed further in 
Chapter 11 is its effect on Francophone Africa's purchases of arms from 
France. The original agreements required that African cooperantn would go 
only to France for arms. Also, the initial French endowment of military 
materials to each country entended to promote "buy French" practices.
This pattern has weakened but maintained vitality in the last fifteen 
years (see Appendix, Table IV).
Finally, some cooperation agreements have provided a "tissue of 
24legitimacy" to French interventions. The role of cooperation agreements 
in interventions will be elaborated upon in Chapter III.
What to Expect of Mitterand?
The above question is especially apposite in light of the fierce 
denunciations by Socialists in opposition of President d'Estaing's 
interventions in Zaire in 1977 and 1978, as well as of his once-close 
identification with the ignoble Emperor Bokassa. Do Francophone Africa's 
more conservative regimes (Gabon, Ivory Coast, Togo, Senegal, Cameroon, 
and Zaire) have cause to be fearful of French disengagement under 
Mitterrand?
The new French president has gone out of his way, on recent visits to
the Ivory Coast and Gabon, to give numerous assurances of continued French 
25support. The French Socialists in government also have a marked tendency 
to live up to all previously arranged agreements, however, unpalatable•
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An example of this is Mitterrand’s insistence, even in the face of almost 
uniform outrage in black Africa, upon carrying through an agreement with 
South Africa concerning civilian nuclear reactors. Also, though Mitterrand 
may be personally repulsed by Mobutu, existing ties with Zaire shall be 
maintained at present levels, Perhaps most importantly Mitterrand proved 
himself willing to commit French flesh and blood to preserve Chad and limit 
Libyan influence on the region. This point will be elaborated upon in 
Chapter IV.
Even though a Socialist Party document statesi "With all African
26governments, all military cooperation agreements ought to be renegotiatedf" 
no great effort at loosening ties ought to be expected. Though the 
Socialist Party recognizes such ties to be remnants of dying imperialism 
in most cases, it also acknowledges France's special role in the Third 
World. This special role consists of promoting French influence (even 
Socialists do not eschew "la Grandeur") in the process of driving a wedge 
between the militarily hegemonic thrusts of the Soviet Union and the 
commercially hegemonic thrusts of the United States. Mitterrand's former 
Minister for Cooperation and Development, Jean-Pierre Cot, validated 
Franco-African military cooperation in his last official statement!
France is obligated to give its partners the military means to maintain
their nonalignment. The network of military cooperation and defense
27agreements is aimed at meeting this need.
The Socialist government has sought to avoid the interventionist policies 
of its predecessor while recognizing that a sudden French military pullout 
would result in a certain amount of chaos in the region. The French
nintervention into Chad in 1983-84 has been rationalized in this way. The 
constraints against any fundamental change in cooperation are formidable, 
not the least among them being the wishes of some African ruling elites 
that things remain as they are. Yet one should not doubt President 
Mitterrand*s sincerity when he admonished the Africans!
Military cooperation does not signify that France is going to
substitute for your political responsibilities. France is not the
28gendorme of Africa and has not the intention to become one.
16
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Chapter II Arms Sales
"The arms sales policy will be progressively converted. Our general 
idea is to limit arms sales and to cease balancing our foreign trade 
with them. In proportion to her power, France is the biggest arms 
vendor in the world. We consider this situation to be damaging to 
our true interests."*
Francoise Mitterrand enunciated the above in 1970 while in opposition 
to President Valery Giscard d'Estaing. Despite Mitterrand's apparent 
desire to alter the nature and size of French arms transfers, there is no 
evidence of fundamental change in French arms salesmanship in Black Africa 
since his assumption to the presidency. This chapter will present a picture 
of what commercial, strategic, and political imperatives guide this policy 
and attempt to explain its structural resistance to change. A short history 
of the evolution of French arms sales to Africa through the d'Estaing 
presidency will be followed by an account of what changes have occured under 
Mitterrand. Finally, a summary of the constraints upon presidential action 
in this area will be offered.
Upon accession to independence, the former French colonies found them­
selves without national armies or military materials. France was willing 
and able to offer the requisite assistance. Most of this assistance took 
place within the logic of the Cooperation Agreements.
France provided these states, "d titre bdn£vol£,” an initial grant of 
equipment and munitions. This grant generally comprised light tanks, 
transport aircraft, and enough material for a 5,000 man force. As is noted 
in Chapter I, France sought to keep these new armies to modest dimensions,
18
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3in order that they would lack the capacities to make war upon other states 
and so that Prance would remain the pre-eminent military power in the 
region. It is apparent, therefore, that the French design for African 
armies owed more to strategic doctrine than to considerations of the 
profits of arms manufacturers.
Yet conmercial motives were not inconsequential in the policy-making 
process. In the Franco-Gabonese cooperation agreement of 1960, it is 
written that Hthe Gabonese Republic, in consideration of maintaining its 
concourse with the French Republic, and in order to ensure the standardization 
of armaments, engages itself to call exclusively upon the French Republic
4for the delivery and renewal of its materials..." (emphasis added). These 
initial grants of weapons throughout the study area resulted in a standard­
ization of armaments and thus laid the basis for the future pattern of arms 
procurement in the region. Even if exclusivity of French supply has not 
guaranteed in each cooperation agreement, certainly French arms merchants 
would enjoy a natural priority in these markets for at least seme time.
Indeed this was the case for all countries in the study area except for 
Mali, which has never procured a measurable amount of arms from France.
The 19708, however, were distinguished by three major shifts in French 
arms transfers to Africa. First of all, a marked desire among all African 
nations developed to reduce their dependency upon their former colonial
masters. An expression of this was movement toward the diversification
5of their arms suppliers. The Ivory Coast, Cameroon, and Togo all 
renegotiated their MTAAs with France in the early and middle 1970s and 
terminously cut in half their arms dependence on France (see Appendix,
Table V). Still, France has remained the principal supplier of arms
11 three
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The second shift in the French arms market was more drastic. Between 
1969 and 1974 the governments of Congo, Benin, and Niger assumed ideological 
directions opposed to strong security links with Prance. In 1969, Major 
Marien Ngouabi proclaimed a Marxist regime in Congo, and despite two presidential 
assassinations, the PCT (Parti congolaise du travail) has remained in power 
up the present. In May of 1981, President Sassou-Neuesson signed a twenty 
year treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union, insuring 
that Congo would continue to look to the East bloc for much of its security 
needs
In 1974, Commander Mathieu Kdrdkou seized power in Benin. In November 
of 1975 hfi proclaimed the Marxist-Levinistoriented Popular Republic of
7
Benin. Here the French share in the arms market dropped the most 
precipitously from 100% in the 1960s to 4.4% in the 1970s.
Also in 1974 Lieutenant-Colonel Seyni Kountchd overthrew the pro-French 
government of President Hamani Diori in Niger. Kountchd has established a 
fiercely independent non-capitalist and non-socialist "society de
0
development." In the meantime, the French market share in Niger has 
nearly disappeared.
The third major shift in French arms sales to Africa involves expansion 
beyond the traditional realm of ex-colonies and into the lucrative markets 
of Zaire and Nigeria. Excepting Ethiopia, these two countries possess the 
largest military establishments in Black Africa.
French involvement in Zaire first appeared in the early 1960s but
9intensified in the 1970s as General Mobutu consolidated his power. This 
growing amity eventually resulted in the 1974 Franco-Zairais MTAA. As is 
reflected in Table V, the French share in the Zairan arms market increased
21
propitiously in the 1970s* Another important aspect of the sales in Zaire 
was the type of weapon being sold. Even before the MTAA was signed, General 
Mobutu was able to purchase thirty "Puma" battle helicopters and fifteen 
Mirage-5 jet fighters from French arms manufacturers. This was top of the 
line technology and firepower unavailable to those countries in the 
traditional French sphere of influence*
The nature and size of this French arms safari is illustrative of two 
currents in French arms transfer policy of the time* Zaire offered 
attractive commercial possibilities for French arms manufacturers. Under 
President Pompidou and especially under President d'Estaing, a policy of 
expanded arms sales throughout the world was aggressively pursued* Sub­
stantial shares in the lucrative Middle Eastern and South American markets 
were gained, and it was logical that an expansion of sales in Africa would 
be sought.
The second, and evidently more important current at work in the policy 
of expanded sales to Zaire involved the ominously expanding Soviet and 
Cuban influence in Angola (directly to the south of Zaire) and elsewhere 
in Africa in the middle 1970s. This phenomenon was perceived as a threat 
to pro-French, pro-Western, and strategic mineral rich Zaire. Greater 
French military cooperation with Zaire, with a view toward enhanced 
stability there, was justified strategically in terms both of safeguarding 
Western interests and of defending French pre-eminence in the region to 
the North and West* Zaire serves as a buffer state for the traditional 
French sphere of influence.
22
That the strategic component of French arms policy to the region is 
of primary importance is supported by the fact that, as good an arms 
market as Zaire is, its weight in the global French arms market is limited.
It follows that the 1977 and 1978 French armed interventions in the Shaba 
(a cobalt-rich area of southern Zaire near the Angolan border) were intended 
more to protect the considerable French strategic capital in Zaire than 
to protect an important commercial arms market.
If strategic imperatives figured so heavily in French arms transfer 
policy, how could France contenance states within her former Nchasse 
gardde" lessening or eliminating their dependence upon France for their 
materials of security? Those countries which almost completely or completely 
turned away from French armies transfers (Benin, Niger, and Congo) are at 
the periphery of French strategic interests within Francophone sub-Saharan 
Africa. In each case, linkages with France in areas other than security, 
particularly in trade and economic assistance, have remained strong. In 
all other places in the study area, though the French market share waned 
in the 1970s, France remains the principle supplier of armaments.
Such were the forces in motion when Mitterrand ascended to the 
presidency in May of 1981. Given his vocal criticism of French arms policy 
in opposition, there was a justifiable apprehension in all quarters as to 
what the new president would do. Would he cozy up to the so-called 
"progressive" states (Benin, Niger, and Congo) at the expense of the more 
conservative states (Gabon, Ivory Coast, Senegal, and Cameroon)? Mitterrand 
had been highly critical of General Mobutu, President d'Estaing's personal 
relationship with him,^ and of the two Shaba interventions. Would the
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French disengage from Zaire? What would all this mean generally for
French arms sales?
At once Mitterrand strove to alloy these concerns. Contracts which
had been signed would be respected, assured External Relations Minister
Claude Cheysson.** This was not an easy policy to follow. For example,
on July 9, 1981, the Minister for Cooperation, Jean-Pierre Cot, declared
12that France would execute her contracts even with Libya, At this time,
Libyan involvement in Chad had escalated.
Though he disdained the personalized relations between ncher cousin"
Giscard and certain African elites, Mitterrand took three personal tours
of Francophone Africa in his first two years. In the Ivory Coast, Senegal,
Cameroon, Gabon, and Togo, the new French president assuaged conservative
13elites, pledging continued French fidelity in all domains. No arms sales 
to these countries were curtailed or cancelled.
Mitterrand had been particularly critical of Giscard1 s fraternal 
relationship with President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire. However, as noted 
in Chapter I of this study, the Socialists have reinforced French links 
with Zaire. Mitterrand's appearance in Kinshasha in October 1982 was seen 
by some observers as appeasement of the Zairian president.
One salient change the French president did initiate was the opening 
of a friendlier dialogue with Benin, Congo, and Niger. The latter, in 
fact, was the first African nation visited by President Mitterrand. In 
addition, he became the first Fr^^h president ever to visit Benin. At 
all stops he declared amity and solidarity with these most fortunate lands. 
Promises of increased economic assistance and the implicit offer of greater
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15cooperation in security matters were preferred.
A cynical observer would conclude that Mitterrand has changed nothing 
of substance in France's arms transfer policy toward Africa. In his 
cynicism he would be* in the main, correct. To explain the lack of move­
ment in this policy area, one must first determine the underpinnings of the 
entire policy. The imperatives that have guided and will continue to guide 
French arms transfer policy are threes commercial, strategic, and 
political.
Though large sections of the French arms industry have been national­
ized under the Socialists, they still must operate within a competitive 
capitalistic international arms market. With the persistant French problems 
of unemployment and a negative balance of trade, the pressures to use state 
power to underwrite economic expansion are powerful indeed.** The traditional 
arguments in favor of expanded arms sales still applys 1) arms sales result 
in longer production lines, thereby reducing line costs for domestic 
production and funding research and development, and 2) arms sales maintain 
a permanent market confrontation with the other major arms producers (USA, 
USSR, Britain). However, since French arms exports to Africa account for 
only 3-5% of total French arms exports, these traditional commercial 
imperatives obviously carry less weight.
Yet there are significant indirect commercial benefits to be derived 
from the maintenance of existing vending patterns. The conspicuous French 
military presence in her former "chasse gardde," buttressed by French 
arms transfers to the area, contributes to the image of France as a great 
power. This prestige may be parlayed into more arms contracts elsewhere
in the Third World.
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These calmercia1 aspects of French arras transfer policy serve strategic 
ends as well. The long production lines keep France close to a war-fighting 
manufacturing footing. The permanent confrontation in Africa a nw markets 
sever the national interest by constraining American and Soviet inroads 
into African security elites.*7 This, in turn, keeps away the undesirables 
from the raw material sources necessary for the French nuclear program, upon 
which the entire French strategic doctrine rests. The image projection of 
"great power" France has a positive effect upon the whole array of French 
strategic interests.
British analyst, Robin Luckham writes that "... it is hard to envision
a demilitarization of relations with Africa without a basic re-examination
18of French strategic doctrine. * .This re-examination has not occurred 
The justifications for French strategic policy in Africa under the Socialists 
remain the same as they were under Giscard. According to both regimes, the 
French must maintain a high military profile in Africa because 1) Africa is 
vital to French strategic interests, 2) the numerous French nationals in 
Africa need protection, and 3) French troops are tnere in any case and will 
be withdrawn when the Africans wish them to be (or, as Mitterrand's one­
time lieutenant, Jean-Pierre Cot said, France is "giving its partners the
19military means to maintain their non-alignment ) •
Despite the progressive sounding language of non-alignment used by 
the Socialists, both positions amount to the same thingt extensive French 
military involvement in Africa for the foreseeable future. The momentum of 
well entrenched French nationalistic imperatives is apparently stronger than 
the temporal ideological vicissitudes of French presidential politics. In 
addition, the African elites (particularly the more conservative ones)
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desire continued deep military contacts with Prance if these contacts
maintain th© political status quo (i.e., their jealously-guarded
privileged political positions). This is demonstrated by the fact that
the most modern and well equipped units in African armies ur* invariably
20the palace guards (French trained). Even the Socialists mm willing to
play upon these elite-to-elite class alliances if they will promote a
21pro-French stability in the area.
Finally, the French strategic position in Africa arid the arms transfer
policy which supports it make good domestic politics. "Le Grandeur" as
a realistic idea may be dated, however, "standing tall" has a strong political
currency in both the U.S. and France. In fact, Mittetfand1s continuation
of French militarism in Africa (including his commitment of troops to
strife-torn Chad) is one of the few areas where he hasn't been universally
excoriated by the French public. Though some halting attempts have been
made by the Socialists to seek ways of restructuring the arms industry so
that tht traditional pressures to export would lessen, one should expect
22the French arms transfer gravy train to keep on rolling.
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Chapter III Interventions
The French have intervened militarily in the countries in question 
no less than fourteen times since 1960. These interventions have varied in 
scale from the tactical support of mercenaries attempting to overthrow the 
government of tiny Benin, to the deployment of 3,400 French fighting men 
in a standoff against formidable Libyan and Libyan-backed forced in Chad.
The aims of each operation have varied as well. In this chapter each 
intervention will be placed into one of three chronically-defined French 
policy frameworks. The first group of interventions, occurring from 1959 
to 1960, belong to the early independence period. From 1968 to 1975, the 
French limited their interventions to a continuing embroilment in Chad.
From 1977 to 1979 there occurred throe interventions bearing a Giscardian 
stamp, in emphasis and tactical method. Following this will be a discussion 
of what steps Mitterrand has attempted to take as president to change the 
nature of French intervention. His policies will be shown to be essentially 
similar to those of his predecessor. An extensive analysis of the 1983-84 
French intervention in Chad, which was ordered and carried by Mitterrand, 
will occur in Chapter IV.
The early post-independence interventions were of a similar character. 
France seemed determined to maintain de facto control where she once held 
sway de jure. There were 60,000 French troops in sub-Saharan African to 
see to this. The African ruling elites were almost entirely dependent 
upon the good graces of the French economically and militarily. Each 
of the six countries involved in this period had signed, upon 
independence, a bilateral Defense Agreement with France. In each
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case the French military was determinant in the survival of the local 
regime.
A uniform pattern of power consolidation emerged among these new 
leaders. Leopold Senghor of Senegal, Hamani Diori of Niger, Francois 
Tombalbaye of Chad, Leon Mba of Gabon, Abb<? Youlon of Congro, and Ahmad 
Ahidjio of Cameroon were, every one of them, the French-backed politico 
under the immediately preceding ir.iependence loi-cadre arrangement. Each, 
upon assuming the organs of state power, outlawed all opposition and 
attempted to create his own one-oarty political systems. Though these 
methods of power consolidation were not unique in Africa, in the case of 
these six, the oppositions were defiant and dangerous enough to require 
French military intervention on behalf of the status quo. The examples 
of Gabon and Cameroon are particularly illustrative.
In Gabon, at the time of independence, there were two major political 
parties. The Gabon Democratic Bloc, led by Leon Mba, and the Second 
Democratic Union of Gabon, led by J. H. Aubaume, were of equal strength 
in the Gabonese National Assembly after the first election. Upon being 
elected prime minister by independent swing votes within the National 
Assembly, Leon Mba summarily dissolved that body.* From 1960 to 1962 
French military support was called upon to squelch minor insurgencies.
In 1964, Mba attempted to legitimize his regime by holding elections while 
at the same time, disallowing opposition. The Gabonese army revolted and 
physically removed Mba from his palace. Resident French troops reacted 
quickly and decisively restoring Mba to power within twenty-four hours.
The Gabon Democratic Party has since then been the only legal party 
in Gabon. Mba'e successor, Omar Bongo, still maintains a relatively large
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contingent of French military advisors (see Appendix, Table IV),
In Cameroon, Ahmad Ahidjio and his Union National earnerounais had
little trouble from legitimate political contenders while ascending to
power. However, the Union des Populations du Cameroon or UPC, a leftist
political party which had been banned by the French in 1955 but which had
since became a formidable guerilla movement, spurred an insurrection among
the Bamilekd, Cameroon's largest ethnic group. The UPC was only put down
2with the assistance of French troops over a period of five years.
These examples show that France was willing to use its own forces 
to maintain its man in power, whether against revolutionary fronts 
or even against the ex-colony's own military. However, such countries 
as Mali, Benin, and Congo did suffer military coups in the middle 1960s*
Why did not the French preserve these regimes, particularly in Congo's 
case, in view of the assistance afforded to maintain the Congolese elite 
from 1960 to 1962?
It seems that after the French defeat in the Algerian War, a re- 
evaluation of overseas military policy occurred. Until 1963# it was very 
important for France to maintain her resolve throughout Africa in order 
not to give heart to their opponents in Algeria* However, at the end 
of this vain and protracted struggle, there was perhaps little enthusiasm 
on the French elite to commit troops in defense of tennous regimes in 
areas at the periphery of French interests in Africa* The countries in which 
France invested the greatest amounts of economic and strategic capital - Ivory 
Coast, Senegal, Gabon, Cameroon, Toga* Niger, and Chad - became the focus 
for Freftlh mililiiry policy in
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In the wake of the Algerian War, a relative military disengagement 
from Africa was effected as part of a general reorganization of the entire 
French military. Personnel actually stationed in Africa declined sharply.
By the end of the 1960s, their role as the expression of French military
3
policy in Africa was to be assumed by the newly-formed force d 1 intervention.
The composition of the force d*intervention as it evolved belies its 
purpose. It is a high speed, mobile force consisting materially of transport 
aircraft, helicopters, light armored cars, armored personnel carriers, 
mobile anti-tank weapons, and Jaguar fighter bombers/ in manpower, this 
force comprises approximately 16,500, broken doen into throe paratrooper
5
divisions, a group of legionnaires, and a helicopter regiment.
The consensus among analysts that these forces are meant primarily for 
Africa is easy to accept. The French nuclear force de frappe is supposed 
to defend the metropolis, and the force d*intervention seems uniquely 
suited to conducting operations of limited scale and duration in regions 
where substantial logistical support exists. Francophone Africa, with 
logistical support facilities at Dakc.r and N'Djemena and with the importance 
accorded it by French policy-makers, seems the most obvious potential field 
of endeavor. The character of some of the later interventions in Africa 
performed by the force d*intervention certainly corresponds to the 
original intentions of its designer.
Thus, French garrisons in Africa and all their attendant political 
risk were pared down/ With French-trained national armies doing most of 
the labor and the highly mobile force d* intervention assisting on an 
ad hoc basin, French strategic interests in the region could be preserved.
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The use of the force is not limited to actual battlefield activities.
Since 1965, France has engaqed in joint bilateral maneuvers with Senegal,
7Ivory Coast, Gabon, Togo, and Zaire. These maneuvers serve four major 
purposes. First and foremost, they provide symbols support for African 
ruling elites. Secondly, they contribute to a "fraternitd d"armes" 
between African military establishments and the French army, thus promoting
9an important element in French influence in key African security organs. 
Thirdly, the settings for the maneuvers train the force d*intervention 
in tropical conditions, honing its ability to act in future crisis. Finally, 
it is claimed that the sharpness of the intervention forces is important 
for the professionalization of the French military, as France has had no 
full-scale military engagements since the Algerian War.^
The middle period in French interventionism consists of various efforts 
in Chad. Since independence this most unfortunate land has known little 
other than sectarian armed strife and full blown civil war. The interven­
tion of 1968 to 1975 and again in 1978 take on significance beyond the 
mere preservation of a pro-French regime in Chad and the symbolic im­
portance of a credible French presence to those more weighty (in terms of 
French economic and strategic investments) countries to the south and 
west. This period saw the emergence of strategic minerals in Chad and 
neighboring Niger as major considerations for French policy.
By 1962, Chad had become a one-party state ruled by the authoritarian 
Francois Tombalbaye. The northern Motion of Chad, the desolate and 
nearly inhospitable areas of Borkou, Baaed!, and Tedessi (BBT) were under
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direct French military administration until 1965, when Tombalbaye 
demanded a French withdrawal. This proved unwise, as Tombalbaye’s 
constituency was in the south of Chad. He was a Christian Sara (a Black 
tribe) very unpopular with the almost uniformly Arabic and Islamic 
northern Chadians. In 1966 FROLINAT (Frout de la liberation national), 
was formed in the north, with the twin aims of procuring a specific 
identity for the north and the promotion of bilingual (Arabic and French) 
education and culture, or the ending of their domination and degradation 
at the hands of the French and the French-backed southerners.**
Tombalbaye was forced to call upon French assistance in 1968 against 
FROLINAT. According to French sources, this anti-guerilla assistance took 
the form of 1,600 men. However, as analyst G.G.H. Joffe succinctly 
explains!
"Despite military intervention by France, from 1968 to 1972, and
again after the 1975 coup, which was led by Army Chief of Staff Felix
Malloum and in which Tombalbaye was killed, the Sara-dominated post-
Independence administration was unable to establish any legitimate
12claim to authority."
Thus, French assistance to Chad appeared to be futile from the start due to 
deep cleavages in the political makeup of Chad. These cleavages only 
deepened and widened with the growing importance of strategic minerals, 
the entry of Moamar Quadaffiinto the scene, and the ceaseless spiral of 
violence.
The strategic materials component of French intervention was already 
operative in the late 1960s as France had cant to depend on Chad neighbor 
to the west, Niger, as a nuclear testing ground and as France's most
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important supplier of uranium and other raw materials. A secure Chad, then 
as now, means less pressure on Niger. Quadaffi's emergence on Libya in 1971, 
stoked the fires of the region still further.
Quadaffi was most forthcoming in aid for FR0L1NAT but not without his 
own quid pro quo. In 1973, Libya occupied the Aozou Strip, a strategic 
minerals-rich band of land running south of the Libya-Chad border. The 
majority leader of FROLINAT, Goukouni Oueddei, grudgingly realized that he 
would have to accede to this infringement if he wanted to continue to 
partake of the Colonel's generous military support.
The eventual French support for Oueddei's chief rival, fellow FROLINAT 
leader Hissen Habre, sprang from the growing French awareness of Libyan 
aims in Chad. In addition to the settling of old land claims and the 
expansion of Libyan mineral exploitation into northern Chad, Quadaffi 
seeks the favorable strategic positioning vis A vis Egypt's "soft" southern 
border a permanent presence in Chad would afford. More troubling to the 
French is Quadaffi's apparent derire to spread subversion throughout the 
predominantly Islamic Sahel region, which spells trouble for French 
interests in Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Cameroon. Most troubling of all, 
however, is that, in view of Quadaffi’s desire to start a nuclear program,
"Libya would dearly like access to Niger's vast uranium deposits. "13 This 
was certainly an eventuality French policy-makers wished to avoid*
Thus, traditional strategic motives (presenting a strong face to the really 
important African countries) and strategic-mineral motives (maintaining access 
to strategic minerale) played roles in the cheiian interventions.
Ttieee wmm motives mould be operative to the Giscardian period g| inter* 
vent ions, mewever, a strong dmse of agit" Soviet and anti-Libyan strategic
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rationale would also be added in the interventions in Zaire and the 
Central African Republic.
The first four years of discard d*Estaing*s septennat as president 
of France featured dramatic changes on the African political landscape.
Th^ years 1974 to 1976 saw the installation of pro-Soviet regimes in 
Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Angola. The growing Soviet and Cuban military 
presence in Africa became unmistakable, in the French sphere of influence, 
tiny Benin declared in 1976 that Marxism-Leninism was he new official 
ideology. These were ominous developments and a French response had to 
be carefully measured.
Also in the early years of the Ciscardian administration, Franca 
accelerated the expansion of her commercial interests beyond traditional 
Francophonie. Zaire was a private example of this development. Coterminously 
with the turn of events in Angola (immediately to the south of Zaire), 
the Mobutu regime in Kinshasha sought increased closeness with France and 
other wettern powers in security matters. The expansion of French arms 
sales to zaire is evidence of both trends (see Appendix, Table V). With 
the Soviets and French expanding their operations at the same time, a clash 
was inevitable.
Benin is of little importance to France strategically or economically. 
Even its symbolic value for the more important French clients would not seem 
to warrant French armed intervention, even in the woke of its 1976 
ideological shift to the Left. However, d'Esvaing initiated covert actions 
in the form of logistical support for mercenary groups bent on ousting 
President Matthien Kerckon. This action was of secondary military
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importance and a failure, yet it serves as an indication of Giscard *s desire 
to make at least a symbolic effort against the seemingly inexorable tid*»
©f the new competition. This symbolism was put to a aterner test i t Htf 
and 1978 in Zaire.
The first major intervention of the d ’tistaing period occurred in Zaire. 
On March 8, 1977, insurgents attacked and proceeded to hold several towns 
in the Shaba region of southeastern Zaire. This particular insurgency had 
a twenty year history of secessionist tendencies in the Shaba. Within a 
few weeks, they were threatening the important mining centers of the 
country, and the 40,000 man Force Armee Zairoia, conmanded personally by 
General Mobutu, was ineffective against this relatively small gtietiila 
group. Mobutu appealed for help and the French delivered by providing 
transport and loqistical support for a 1,400 man Moroccan contingent.14 
The Insurgents retreated without engaging the Moroccans and the war was 
over in eighty days.
However, the guerilla bands remained intact and the Zairian army 
remained discredited. French and Belgian officers stayed in Zaire to 
"assist Mobutu in the rebuilding and restructuring of the military hierarchy
as well as in the training of the FAZ in an attempt to make it a better
15fighting force." This effort proved fruitless.
On May 3, 1978, the guerillas struck again, this time driving deeper 
into the Shaba, in effect pointing a dagger at the heart of Zaire*s means 
of generating badly-needed foreign exchange - the mining sections of the 
Shaba. The FAZ failed pathetically again, and this time, 700 French 
legionnaires (under the pretext of protecting the white population) were 
called upon to help drive out the intruders.16 in a week the French had 
'.'Succeeded.
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Perhaps the presence of 2,000 whites in the Shaba and French comn^rcial 
interests in that mining region were sufficient reasons to send the legion­
naires. However, there were larger reasons of state at play. France is 
dependent upon Zaire for cobalt, a necessary component of military jet 
engines. Therefore, the advance of guerillas seemingly sponsored by 
Marxist Angola was not viewed with approbation. Moderate and conservative 
French politicians wanted a "coup d*arret* to Soviet-Cuban expansionism.
Also, the French wanted to maintain Mobutu, such as he is, in power until
17a reasonable alternative presented itself. The French president could 
always claim to be acting upon Mobutu's request, in full support of the 
stated Organization of Airican Unity good of maintaining the inviolability 
of national boundaries.
The last major intervention of the d'Estaing years was motivated more
baldly by strategic factors. The first president of the Central African
Republic (CAR) was French-sponsored David Dacko. In the ensuing years,
however, President Dacko developed close contacts to the Communist Chinese
18and the Eastern Bloc. in 1966 the French in the CAR blithely observed
the ousting of Dacko by a young army officer named Jean-Bedel Bokassa.
By 1972 Bokassa had named himself president for life. His delusions of
grandeur reached a peak whan on December 14, 1977 he anointed himself
Emperor Bokassa 1 of the Central African aspire in a twenty-two million
19dollar ceremony, paid for largely by France.
Boon thereafter, however, Bokassa began to cozy up to Colonel Quadaffi 
and,in fact, it was while on a trip to Libya in 1979 that "with the
support of French armed forces, David Dacko re-established the Republic."20
According to Robin Luckham, "Operation Barracuda" (the French military
term for this action) could not have been achieved with such eas* had the
French delays, for Libyan anti-aircraft weapons were nearly in place at
21the Bangui airport.
It seems that in the CAR the French wanted to prevent a destabilising 
Libyan influence from festering in the middle of the continent. Ideology 
played no role in the intervention, as the French were willing to re-install 
Dacko, a man with whom they had had previous ideological differences. 
Economic considerations simply did not come into play in one of the world * s 
poorest countries. Though not the factor it is in Zaire or Chad, access to 
strategic raw materials seems to have been at least a background issue.
The French have had a strategic raw material agreement with the CAR since
m o.
Some common threads existed between the interventions in Zaire and the
CAR. Each emphasised the use of small, highly mobile forces to maximum
effectiveness. In other words, the apparent idea behind the force
d*intervention had been successfully translatod into action. The failure
in Benin did not involve intervention forces.
The overall reasons of state for these operations were not primarily
economic. French economic relations with Africa had been peripheralised
with respect to global French trade for some time. The common strategic
currents were two: 1) the desire to restrict the expansion of Scviet-
Cuban or Libyan influence, and 2) the French need of access to itrategic 
22raw materials. Despite their loud protest of these interventions as 
they happened, the Socialists could not reject these strategic priorities 
once they were ii control of t}ie government.
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"When it came to power, the Socialist Party called for an end to the
military interventions of the past, arguing that instability in Africa
can only be pre-empted by a more equitable global economic system," accord-
23ing to American analysis Alex Rondos. Mitterrand's first Minister for
Cooperation and Development, Joan-Piorre Cot, said in his last official
statement that the difference between Socialist African policy and that of
its predecessors would be "in the strict prohibition against any interven-
24tion in the domestic affairs of our partners," In the same statement,
however, Cot re-emphasize^ the need for Franc© to put non-alignment into
25practice '.n light of external threats. Cot also advanced the twin 
justification for a continuing French military presence in Africa. First 
of all, a sudden French pullout would result in destabilization and chaos. 
Secondly, the French remain there at the insistence of the African leaders 
and will leave if the Africans want them to. Mitterrand himself, in what 
was supposed to be a rinqing declaration of a new French ethic in Africa, 
said during a 1982 visit to Nigeri
"Presence, yes, interference,:^'. This has political significance, 
but it is in the field and in actual practice that it has to be 
observed...France must speak clearly to its partners and tell them: 
'Military cooperation does not mean that France is going to take the 
place of your own political responsibilities, as may have happened 
in the past.1
In the light of this rhetoric, what is Mitterrand's record? In 
September of 1981, French troops in the CAR did nothing as David Dacko was 
overthrown by General Anatd Kolingba. Thus, Dacko had been twice burned 
by French indifference to his political well-being. This, however, appear..
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to have been a more-or-less conventional power struggle, and the CAR's 
orientation toward Prance has not been radically altered.
In Upper Volta, one of the world's least developed nations, on August
1983, coup brought Thomas Sankara to power. Sankara has modeled his
revolution upon that of neighboring Ghana. Also, Sankara
has accepted a thirty million dollar loan from Libya for "road resurfacing,"
an almost certain euphemism for a military grant. The potential consequences
of a substantial Libyan presence in Upper Volta (now officially called
Burkina Paso) are somewhat ominous for French interests in the region.
However, "The French have made clear that their commitment to protecting
Ivory Coast and other close allies of Prance in the region does not, at
27present, call for the toppling of neighboring regimes." Upper Volta 
itself has never been more than peripheral for French interests, economically 
or militarily.
These are two situations in which France conceivably could have 
intervened. However, the Kolinga coup did not put at risk French access to 
the CAR's strategic raw materials or advance a perilous ideology in central 
Africa. The events in Burkina Faso did not imminently threaten the sub­
stantial French strategic interests in Senegal or the Ivory Coast, and a 
line was clearly drawn on those points. In other words, it is quite 
probable that the d'Bstaing government would have reacted in a similar 
fashion. When Mitterrand was finally compelled to intervene in 1983 and 
1984 in Chad, access to strategic raw materials and questions of France's 
overall strategic weight in Africa were at issue, as will be elucidated in 
Chapter IV.
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In general, French military intervention in Africa has two faces. The 
first is that conditioned by political circumstances. This includes all 
military operations effected for whatever reasons. The motives behind 
interventions as well as the character of their execution has changed 
over time, as this chapter has attempted to demonstrate. The second face 
of French intervention is its permanence. It consists of a continuing set 
of cooperation agreements, military bases, arms sales, joint military 
maneuvers, and the existence of the force d*intervention. This second 
face is a necessary precondition for the first or ad hoc face.
Though Mitterrand has demonstrated some movement away from the first 
type of intervention, though this point can be contradicted convincingly 
with reference to Chad, he undoubtably has left the institutional frame­
work of intervention, the permanent intervention, almost entirely intact.
Of course, he found this infrastructure useful when he finally decided to 
move men into Chad in 1983. The intractableness of this structure, its 
resistance to chango, have been alluded to in Chapters I and II. The 
salient fact is that, should the Socialists leave the government in 1985, 
and this seems increasingly likely, all the necessary tools will be in 
place should a succeeding administration choose to pursue a more militarily
activist role.
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Chapter V "Operation Manta"
In this chapter the most recent and most extensive (in terms of troops 
deployed) French intervention will be described* analysed* and placed into 
the context of French military activities in Africa since 1960. Background 
detail not included in Chapter III will be presented below. If one were to 
tie Guallist politics with the consistent French strategic priorities 
operating in their African military policy* then this seems to be the case 
of an outwardly reluctant Socialist administration reacting in a remarkably 
Guallist fashion. It appears as though Mitterrand was forced to choose 
between going with a military operation or abandoning Chad to Quadaffi's 
clients. After an apparently successful "Operation Manta" was terminated 
by a negotiated mutual Franco-Libyan troop withdrawal* it was revealed that 
Quadaffi had duped Mitterrand by holding back 1*000 troops. Forced by 
circumstance into an interventionist policy he was uncomfortable with* 
Mitterrand seemed to have pulled it off with aplomb* only to be humiliated 
in the end. As with his domestic policies* the French president cannot seem 
to catch a break. The point of this chapter is that the same principles 
that have juided the major interventions of the Giscardian past were 
operative in the Socialist recent past. The determinant strategic under* 
pinnings of French military policy in Africa* seemingly vindicated by 
Quadaffi'c duplicity* are neither Rightist nor Leftist but peculiarly French.
At the core of the Chadian problem are legacies of French colonialism; 
the state boundaries were arbitrarily drawn. The landscape of northern 
Chad is largely desert and is inhabited by particular cultural and ethic 
populations! Nomadic* Islamic* Arabaphone* and Bedouin. The more
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hospitable climate of the south of the country supports mainly sedentary
farmers, Christian or animist, and racially Black. The south adjusted
more easily to French colonial techniques. Southern Chad has experienced
civil administration since the 1920s, whereas the north remained under
direct French military rule until 1965.* At the time of independence
southern Chad possessed many trumpst a large number of administrative
cadres, a wage culture, seventy to eighty percent of the country's export
production, the entire cotton industry, and even some modest industrial- 
2izetion.
Political power in independent Chad was dominated for fifteen years 
by Francois Tombalbaye, a southern Sara tribesman. He was overthrown in 
1975 by General Felix Malloum, a northerner. Goukouni oueddei ousted 
Malloum and Hissen Habr£ ousted Oueddei. According to French Chadian 
scholar Christian Bouquet, "...the Hissen Habrd administration has been 
marked by the same discriminatory attitudes of its predecessors, with each
3faction vying for pre-eminence being based ethnically and regionally."
Even within FROLINAT, a northern grouping, there was bitter divisiveness. 
Goukouni and Babr* were once allied in FROLINAT and even served together 
in the post-Mailoom GUNT (Government d'Union National du Tchad). However, 
for the past six years they have been pledged to one another's destruction.
Against the backdrop of such discordant geographical, economic, ethnic, 
and cultural factors, one cannot understand Chad to be a nation state.
Its inherent instability and its desperate economic condition (one of the 
world's thirty least developed countries)leave Chad extremely vulnerable 
to foreign pressures.
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Libya had a traditional claim to the Aozou Strip, a 100,000 km area 
of reputed mineral wealth located on the Chad-Libya border. This was 
effectively annexed by Libya in 1974. By 1978, the central Chadian 
government of President Malloum was forced to recognize the dominence of 
the Libyan-supported Goukouni in the northern provinces of Borkou, Ennedi, 
and Tibeszi (BET). By August 1979, Malloum had fallen, being replaced by 
the aforementioned, Goukouni-led GUNT. The GUNT was intended to incorporate 
all interested parties (mostly northern groupings) into a sharing of power. 
However, within eight months Defense Minister liabre's FAN (Forces Armdes 
du Nord) and President Goukouni1s FAP (Forces Armees Populaires) were
5engaged in a ferocious battle for the capitol city of N'Djamena.
With Libyan assistance in the form of heavy materials delivery, 
localized bombardments by the L /an Air Force, and the engagement of regular 
Libyan units on the battlefield, Goukouni was able to capture N'Djamena by 
the end of 1980.* On January 6, 1981 Libya announced a fusion of itself 
and Chad. This engendered further dissension within the GUNT and mobilized 
external actions against Libya. Egypt and the Sudan furnished arms to 
Habre's FAN and France announced the abrogation of certain contracts with 
Libya. As the FAN drove toward N'Djamena, France was noticeably slow about
7delivering arms to the recognized authority of the GUNT, thus expressing
by default her distaste for Goukouni. The capital fell to Habrd on June 7,
81982. By October, Habrd had been recognized by France, the UN, and OAU. 
Habrd's successful sally into the northern stronghold of Faya-Largeau 
precipitated a devastating counterstrike by Goukouni and the Libyans, who 
still had firm control over much of the BET. The rapid advance of the
2
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Libyans and the PAP southward toward the capital caused Habre to plead for 
assistance from all quarters and Prance eventually responded with her third 
major intervention into her former colony.
To answer intense Libyan air attacks, the United States sent ground- 
to-air missiles and Prance provided anti-aircraft equipment. On August 9, 
1983 President Mitterrand decided to deploy Prench troops in defense of 
Habre's regime. "Operation Manta" was originally comprised of about 3,000 
French soldiers deployed along the fifteenth parallel, the so-called 
Salal-Arada line. The situation stabilised w- the Libyans and their 
allies occupying the BET and the rest of the country remaining under the
9
authority of Hissen Habrd.
Mitterrand defended this intervention as being motivated by "la
responsabilitd de la Prance dans l'equilibre africain."*^ For Mitterrand,
this responsibility was to be prosecuted through the follcwing five-point
policyi 1) a federal system for the interior of Chad, 2) consultation with
the Chadiann themselves upon the nature of their own institutions,
3) integrity of the national territory, although Prance remained unconcerned
about the Aozou Strip, 4) the departure of all foreign armies, and
115) a pact of nonaggression among all the countries of the region. France
was not willing to put her troops into a disposition to realize point three
by force. Mitterrand sought to reunite "tous lea Tchiadians autour d'une
12table" for negotiations.
In support of this policy9 Prance deployed up to 3,400 troops. One 
reconnaissance pilot was shot down in August of 1983 and nine infantry 
men were killed on April 7, 1984 in a military explosion of unclear 
circumstance. Domestic Prench support, described as "widespread" on
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on March 22, 1984 later eroded. Still, the Libyans were extremely
reluctant to confront the French directly at the Salal-Arada line, despite
Quadaffi's declaration that "France has no alternative but retreat or
15protracted war, as was the case in Algeria."
What is at stake for France in Chad? French African analyst Phillippe 
Docraene offers this aassessment!
"The French engagement in Chad is explained not by commercial 
considerations, but by strategic reasons. The geographical position 
of Chad is in fact the key to central Africa and its control is 
indispensable to those who want to play a role in the heart of the 
continent. In addition, Chad constitutes the western border of 
Niqer, the fifth largest producer of uranium in the world and 
the biggest source of that mineral for the French atomic industry,
a nation with considerable mineral reserves (coal, oil, iron, and
.. . „16 tin)."
This view is supported by an account of the defense and mutual cooperation 
arrangements between France and Chad. The mutual defense mechanism is an 
automatic one, which means that France may intervene militarily anytime 
she claims a foreign threat to Chad. Also, these agreements provide for 
preferential French access to strategic raw materials.** Add to this the 
considerable French conmerciai interests in Nigeria (immediately south), 
and the symbolic importance for the benefit of French pseudo-dependencies 
in Africa (such as Senegal, Gabon, Ivory Coast, and Djibouti) of a credible 
French reaction to a military threat to one of their neighbors, and one 
must conclude that a considerable measure of French prestige it on the 
line. Success or failure in Chad impacts upon French strategic interests
14
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elsewhere, the credibility of "force de frappe," and Western interests 
in the Sudan.
Mitterrand's willingness to wait for interminable and seemingly futile 
negotiations to ameliorate the situation diu not seem to bear well upon 
French credibility. French journalist Francois Soudan offered that 
Cassandra-like warnings
"His margin of initiative is nearly non-existants France is hardly 
able to budge militarily without risking an uncontrollable escalations 
and she is not able to receive blows indefinitely without losing her 
credibility."18
Hissen Habre saw early on the futility of negotiations when he claimed 
that "diplomatic means will not force the Libyans to withdraw from Faya-
# *19Largeau."
The French policy alternatives in Chad in some ways reflect the 
quandry in which Socialist have found themselves in attempting to form 
an overall African policy. To be militarily activist or not to be militarily 
activist, that is the question. The Giscard d'Eataing administration tried 
to minimize the risks of its activist policy by making the operations 
quick, efficient, anu sudden faits acccmplis. The Socialists attempted 
to walk a tight rope between action and in action in Chad. Howover, in 
view of the disengagement from Africa of Grea* Britain, the reluctance of 
the United States to commit more than sane supplies, and the utter failure 
of all attempted intra-African stabilizations of Chad, it appears as 
though any decisive anti-Libyan initiative would have to be French. The 
policy options were basically three; 1) push northward militarily in order 
to control the entire country; 2) withdraw forces from Chad, avoiding the
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endless conflagration and letting the conflicts resolve themselves locally;
and 3) maintain the military status quo, looking toward greater stability,
in the least, even if this means a do facto partition, Diplomatic and
otiie** inor*’ subtle forms of pressure could also be exerted upon Libya,
Would a French-backed military move northward have facilitated French
2interests? To drive an entrenched Libya out of 500,000 km of the BET 
would have incurred a tremendous cost in French lucre and blood. An already 
fragile French economy could have been shattered by the burden of financing 
an army of occupation. A protracted and politically damaging armed struggle 
could have resulted. Not only would this policy have been disastrously 
expensive had it failed# it also would probably have been too expensive had it 
succeeded. Oddly enough, a French unif ication of the country by force would 
probably have exacerbated the racial and ethnic tensions that have rent 
the area for many years.
Avoiding the fight entirely would not have won France any new friends
in th*» Third World. French analyst Rene Lemarchand writes, "The visits
paid to Washington by '/.airian President Sese Seko Mobutu and Sudanese
President Abdou Diouf at the height of the crisis made it plain to Mitterrand
20that France was not the only source of assistance for African states."
The threats to the French position in Africa came not only from adversaries# 
therefore.
The prima facie untenableness of the first two options pushed Mitterrand
toward "Operation Manta". Mitterrand's principal objectives - to avoid a
direct confrontation with Libya and at the same time to display enough of
21deterrent on the ground to prevent a Libyan advance on the capital
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seemed well served by this maintenance of a military status quo. Yet one 
must keep in mind the long term intractableness of Chad's problems. The 
earlier french interventions had not contributed to any solutions and 
certainly this intervention would not distinguish itself in that way 
either. Though Mitterrand's efforts to negotiate with Quadaffi might 
appear softheaded and unwise, the observer ought to bear in mind that he 
had few alternatives.
One year and one month after the initiation of "Operation Manta,"
Mitterrand's low-key diplomacy seemed to bear fruit. The French president
22and Colonel Quadaffi signed a troop withdrawal accord. Two months later,
Mitterrand and Quadaffi declared jointly that "not one French soldier,
not one Libyan soldier will remain in Chad. The people of Chad should
23settle their problem by themselves." One day later, Mitterrand was
forced to acknowledge that 800*1,000 Libyan troops remained in Chad in
the wake of a French pullout. Near the end of 1984, France officially
conceded to the Libyan occupation of northern Chad. France would take no
further military action to dislodge 3,000*5,000 Libyan troops supporting
24rebel leader Goukouni Oueddei. Thus, one of the finer hours of the 
Mitterrand presidency, the troop withdrawal agreement, devolved into a 
great humiliation.
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Conclusion
The obstacles to the transformation of cooperation* arms sales* and 
intervention policies have proven strong enough to retain the substance 
and almost all of the structure of French militarism in Africa* despite 
the high intentions of the French Socialist Party. The chief obstacle is 
the Socialists1 adoption of much of the content of the traditional 
Guallist strategic vision of a France ever vigilant of her adversaries to 
the East, and independent (to the greatest extent possible) of her allies 
in Europe and America. Indeed* the Socialist embrace of a kind of "Third 
World!sm*M in which a France disengaged and distinguished from both 
superpowers plays a prominent and unique role in the emergency of the 
underdeveloped countries* necessitates that France promotes herself as 
a viable third choice* a global power with which to be reckoned. In what 
region is France able to put forward a face of international power? The 
Soviet. Union has Eastern Europe as an obvious sphere of influence. The 
United States has Central America. France is unique among non-superpowers 
in having a rather extensive geographical area still arguably within her 
security sphere. It is how France conducts herself in sub-Saharan* 
French-speaking Black Africa that largely informs the weight accorded 
France in her dealings with the Third World particularly* and with the 
world generally.
Such grand aspirations for France play to a receptive public* whether 
they be pronounced by the Right or the Left. "Le Grandeur" is an enduring 
component of French nationalism. Therefore* it is good presidental 
politics to pursue it. A French leader would disengage from Africa at 
his political peril. The major elements of Franco-African military
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cooperation remain in place today, even in those countries whose regimes 
Mitterrand finds repugnant, mainly because to alter radically or dismantle 
these elements would diminish the disposal of French power in the region.
Arms sales have continued apace with those of the d'Estaing administra­
tion. Most arms go to non-democratic and non-progressive regimes (such as 
those of Zaire, Ivory Coast, and Chad), these transfers acting iniupport of the 
overall strategic vision and in support of forces disposed against an 
increased Libyan or Soviet presence on the continent. To the extent that 
commercial motives exist (which is not to much of an extent), these motives 
simply add momentum to the strategic rationale for arms vending. The 
domestic political benefits of lower unemployment and a more favorable 
balance of trade also militate against any serious scaling back of arms 
transfers.
The intervention in Chad called 'Operation Manta" showed, if nothing 
else, that France is still willing to put together a show of force in 
defense of its privileged position in Africa. The eventual withdrawal 
of the French troops from Chad does not negate the possibility of their 
redeployment, particularly if the Socialists are displaced in the next 
election by a more militarily activist group of policy-makers (a probable 
eventuality). Because of the failure of the Socialists to transform 
radically the structure of French militarism (cooperation, arms sales, 
military advisors, force d'intervention), the means remain in place for an 
increase in French interventionist activity.
Thus, in certain ways, Mitterrand is a hostage to circumstances.
After all, the French arms manufacturers must operate in a basically 
competitive international market. The strategic imperatives of anti-
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Sovietism and a militarily formidable France for its asm sake seem 
immutable. French nationalism will not readily accept a reduced France,
On the other hand, the Socialist policy is a contradiction. They 
attempted to transform individual aspects of French militarism while at 
the same time accepting the basic premises of the strategic doctrine of 
their predecessors. As long as French nationalism! with its significant 
electoral impact, links France's international prestige with her successful 
maintenance of a dominant presence in her last sphere of influence} as long 
as France remains more than rhetorically antagonistic toward 8oviet and 
Libyan ideological and military encroachments and toward American 
commercial encroachments in Africa, France will continue to present a 
high military profile in her former "chasse qard^e", no matter what political 
grouping occupies the Blysde.
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Table I
MILITARY COOPERATION AGREEMENTS
Country Defense Agreements
Military/Technica1 
Assistance Agreements
Benin April 24, 1961 
No longer in force
April 24, 1961 
February 27, 1975
Cameroon November, 1967 November 13, 1960 
February 21, 1974
Central African 
Republic
August 15, 1960 August 13, 1960 
September 8, 1968
Chad August 15, 1960 August 11, 1960 
May 9, 1964 
February 6, 1976
Congo August 15, 196) 
Withdrew 1972
August 15, 1960 
January 1, 1974
Gabon August 17, 1960 August 17, 1960 
August 25, 1965
Ivory Coast April 24, 1961 April 24, 1961 
December 4, 1973
Mali October 14, 1977
Niger April 24, 1961 
No longer in force
April 24, 1961 
February 19, 1977
Senegal June 22, 1960 
March 29, 1974
June 22, 1960 
March 29, 1974
Togo July 10, 1963 October 29, 1961 
March 23, 1976
Upper Volta April 24, 1961
Zaire May 22, 1974
Sour cen
Bokanga Mpendele Lokolutu, Qaulllam and Francophone Africa* Doctoral 
D i n • , University of Illinois, Urbane-Champaign, 1982, p, 502. 
Remain Yakeatchouk, "La cooperation mtlitaire de l'Afrlgue noire avec 
lea Puissances avec la France,* Afrioue Contsmooralne 127 
(July-8eptsmber, 1983), 14.
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COMPARISON OF AFRICAN
Table II
TROOP STRENGTHS IN 1977
Source A* Source B#
Country Military Paramilitary Total Total
Benin 2,000 + 1,000 B 3,000 3,000
Cameroon 5,600 + 10,000 • 15,600 11,000
Central
African
Republic
900 + 1,200 * 2,100 7,090
Chad 5,200 6,000 B 11,200 9,000
Congo 6,000 3,500 - 9,500 7,000
Gabon 1,000 + 3,300 ■ 4,300 4,000
Guinea 6,650 + — m 5,650 4,000
Ivory Coast 4,900 4 3,000 m 7,900 9,000
Mali 4,200 4 5,000 m 9,200 7,060
Niger 2,100 4 1,760 m 3,960 4,000
Senegal 6,400 4 1,600 m 8,000 13,000
Togo 1,750 4* 1,200 ■ 2,950 4,000
upper Volta 3,000 4 2,150 ■ 5,150 6,000
Zaire 33,000 4 20,000 m 53,000 53,000
Sourcest
•World Armies, John Keegan, ed. (now YorKt Facts of File, 1980). 
lElikia M*Bokolo, Le Continent Convoltd (Parisi Etudes VivAntes, 1980), 
p. 201.
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Table 111
FRENCH MILITARY INTERVENTIONS IN AFRICA
Country Dates Interventions
Benin 1977 French Special Services aided Anti-Pres. 
Kerekou mercenary forces
Cameroon 1959-64 Counterrevolutionary war vs, UPC
Central
African
Republic 1979 Opn. Barracuda# the disposal of
(Qnpire) Emp, Bokassa
Chad 1960-63 Maintenance of internal public order
1968-75 Support for Pres. Tombalbaye vs, FROLINAT# 
to maintain internal public order
1978 Support for Pres, Malloum vs. FROLINAT
1983-84 Opn, Manta# support for Pres. Hissen 
Habrd v. Libyans
Congo 1960# 62 Maintenance of internal public order
Gabon 1960# 62 
1964
Maintenance of internal public order
Niger 1963 Military support of Pres. Hamani Diori 
in power struggle vs. his political opponents
1973 Attempted prevention of military coup
Senegal 1959-60 Support for Pres. Senghor during breakup 
of Mali Federation# attempted coup by 
Mamadou Dia
Zaire 1977 Suppression of Shaba rebellion (Shaba I)
in * Suppression of Shaba rebellion (Shaba II)
Spurges i
Phillipe Decrasne# Vlaillt Afrjgue Jeunes Nations (Paris* Presses 
Univeraitaires de France# 1982)# p. 244.
Robin Luckham, "French Militarism in Africa#" Review g£ African 
Political Economy (1991), p, 61.
Bokanga Mpendele Lokolutu, Gaulilam and Francophone Africa#
Doctoral niss.# University of Illinois# Urbana-Champaign# 1982. 
p. 517.
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Table IV
FRENCH MILITARY AFRICAN COMMITMENTS
Country
French Troops in 
Bases and Military 
Installations# 1981
French Military 
Advisors 
January 1980
French
Residents
1980
Benin mm — 2 # 398
Cameroon 2 or 3 75 16,052
Central
African
Republic
1#100 32 mm
Chad mm 81 mm
Congo — 8 5 #863
Cagon 500 132 26#824
Guinea mm — —
Ivory Coast 400 Ill 61#233
Mali m m 5 3 #000
Niger m m 63 3,890
Senegal 1#200 40 18#704
Togo mm■ 71 3#856
upper Volta — 18 3 #702
Zaire ... 126 3,233
Sourcei
Robin Luckham# "French Militarism in Africa#" Review of African Political 
Economy (1981)# p. 57.
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FRENCH AFRICAN ARMS SALES AS PERCENT OF AFRICAN ARMS IMPORTS
Table V
Country
Percent of 
1960-1969
Arms Import Purchases from France 
1970-1980
Benin 100 4.4
Cameroon 75,8 43.5
Central African Republic 75.4 98.1
Chad 100 98.4
Congo 49.9 24.7
Gabon 28.5 52.7
Guinea 0 17.5
Ivory Coast 97 52.7
Mali 0 0
Niger 69*5 1.2
Senegal 97 97
Togo 100 56.9
upper Volta 100 47.5
Zaire 16.6 68.0
Sourcei
Robin Luckham, "French Militariam in Africa," Raviw of African Political 
Boonaav (1981), p. 57.
Table VI
STRATEGIC RAW MATERIALS COOPERATION AGREEMENTS
Country
Bonin
Chad
Central African Republic
Congo
Gabon
Niger
Senegal
Dates
April 24, 1961
August 15, 1960
August 10, 1960
August 15, 1960
August 17, 1960 
February 12, 1974
April 24, 1961
June 22, 1960
Sourcei
Bokanga Mpendele Lokolutu, Qua111am and Francophone 
Africa, Doctoral Dies., University of Illinois, 
Urbana-Champaign, 1982, p. 502.
